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For many years, I have argued that the United States’ constitu-
tional vision is deficient because of our surprising inability to appre-
ciate what I now call the responsive character of our reconstructed 
Constitution.  I describe our Constitution as responsive because dur-
ing Reconstruction it was, to an important extent, remade in re-
sponse to the lessons of slavery.1  Our understandings of citizenship 
and of basic human rights were enriched by the experience and cri-
tique of slavery, and these enriched understandings informed the Re-
construction Amendments’ elaboration of civil rights. 
For many years, I have argued for what is, in essence, a responsive 
constitutionalism.  I emphatically do not argue for originalism vis-à-vis 
the Constitution’s Second Founding in the Reconstruction period.  I 
argue instead that our understanding of the basic rights set out in the 
Reconstruction Amendments should be contextualized by an appre-
ciation of the Amendments’ anti-slavery origins.  Because anti-slavery 
critique informed the process of constitutional reconstruction, it 
should inform our interpretations of the reconstructed Constitution.  
The Reconstruction Amendments responded to slavery—not only in 
the sense that they were intended to address the harms done to en-
slaved people, but also (and, I think, more importantly) in the sense 
that they were intended to universalize human freedom and define 
human freedom in contrast to slavery.  When I speak of a responsive 
constitutionalism, I speak of a jurisprudence that is alive to this in-
sight. 
My arguments for a responsive constitutionalism have not won 
wide acceptance here in the United States.  Elsewhere, however—
notably in post-Nazi Germany and in post-apartheid South Africa—
responsive constitutionalism thrives and richly informs the elabora-
tion of basic rights.  I persevere in the hope that examples of respon-
sive constitutionalism abroad will inspire a responsive constitutional-
ism at home.  I address here the example of South Africa, exploring 
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how responsive constitutionalism has supported the development of a 
concept of human dignity. 
Lourens Ackermann, a former Justice of the South African Consti-
tutional Court, has explained that, in the constitutional scheme of 
the new South Africa, human dignity itself is not conferred, but ra-
ther accepted categorically as an attribute of humankind.2  Respect 
for the dignity of each human being is conferred as an independent 
right, but dignity itself is inalienable.3  As Justice Ackermann argues, 
categorical acceptance of the dignity of all persons informs—and has 
the potential to broaden—the interpretation of all other human 
rights.4 
But what is human dignity, and what does it mean to respect it?  
The concept of respect for human dignity has, I think, been best un-
derstood in the process of contemplating its lack.  Certain constraints 
on people and certain ways of relating to people strike us as deeply 
inconsistent or dissonant with the respect they are due.  We then rea-
son back to discover what causes our sense of dissonance.  When we 
contemplate physical abuse or the taking of human life, our sense of 
dissonance may reflect identification and faith that our own kind is 
precious.  And identification may encompass a communal feeling 
such that the pain or death of one is felt as a direct loss to all.5  But 
our sense of dissonance may also reflect an understanding of what it 
means to be human—a belief that human beings are self-aware in 
ways that add dimensions to experiencing abuse or facing death.  
Surely when we move from the physical to the psychological and so-
cial aspects of respect for human dignity, understandings about what 
it means to be human are central to our sense of what respect is due.  
When we contemplate coercion or constraint with respect to such 
things as sexual intimacy, marriage, reproductive choice, political 
voice, or religious observance, we test the coercion or constraint in 
terms of our understandings of human capacity and human desire.  
How, we ask, is it right to treat a reasoning being who has self-
awareness, moral consciousness, and ambitions about the construc-
tion of a life?  This, I think, is what we mean when we say that human 
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2004 N.Z. L. REV. 633, 643–47 (2004). 
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 4 Id.; see also STUART WOOLMAN, Dignity, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 36–1 
to 75 (Woolman et al., eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 5 See Drucilla Cornell, A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence:  Ubuntu, Dig-
nity, and Reconciliation, (2004) (manuscript, on file with author) (explaining that the 
concepts of ubuntu and seriti stand for an interconnectedness such that harming one 
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life is valued for its expressive, as well as its natural, qualities.6  We re-
spect human dignity in order to give reign to human expressive ca-
pacities and desires. 
The process of reasoning back from a sense of dissonance has 
been most profoundly instructive in the contemplation of extreme 
violations of human rights.  Genocide, slavery, and apartheid have 
sharpened our sense of both the literal and expressive value of hu-
man life.  This is why, as Justice Ackermann has pointed out, there 
may be a special kind of wisdom in responsive—or, to use Justice 
Ackermann’s term, “reactive”—constitutional thought. 
The new South Africa would see itself as transformed by a deter-
mination not to repeat the abuses of the past.  And Justices of its 
Constitutional Court realize that this transformation should be 
grounded in an understanding of how and why those past abuses af-
fronted human dignity.  The South African Constitutional Court’s 
decisions respecting, for example, the death penalty, procedural due 
process, consensual sodomy, and gay marriage all show that respon-
sive constitutionalism can yield a respect for human dignity that 
commits one to much more than saying “never again” to apartheid. 
Because the reconstructed United States Constitution is respon-
sive to slavery, it might have been interpreted to encompass an anti-
slavery understanding of human dignity and the respect that human 
beings require in light of their basic dignity.  But our Constitution 
has not been so interpreted.  As a result, our jurisprudence touching 
on human rights is impoverished.  Opinions of the United States Su-
preme Court guaranteeing or compromising the right to marriage, 
procreative choice, parenthood, sexual intimacy, procedural fairness, 
protection against extreme punishments, or control over the manner 
of one’s death are uninformed by a story of how and why our Consti-
tution should protect such things.  The closest thing we have to a 
concept of human dignity is the statement, made in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey,7 relied upon in Lawrence v. Texas,8 woefully lacking sup-
port in the current Court, and derided by Justice Scalia as “sweet-
mystery-of-life”9 dictum:  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not de-
fine the attributes of personhood were they formed under compul-
 
 6 Id. at 11 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION:  AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)). 
 7 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 8 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9 Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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sion of the State.”10  The Court has never related this idea about hu-
man dignity and human rights to our national history of slavery, 
emancipation, and constitutional reconstruction. Still, if we were to 
read, in light of our history, the guarantees contained in our Recon-
struction Amendments, we would see a notion of individual worth 
and the accompanying belief in a right of self-definition intentionally, 
and responsively, implanted. 
To demonstrate the difference a responsive constitutionalism can 
make, I draw your attention briefly to the opinions in which first the 
South African Constitutional Court and then the United States Su-
preme Court declared unconstitutional the criminalization of homo-
sexual sodomy.11  Comparing these opinions can teach us a great 
deal.  I focus here on how responsive constitutionalism nourishes the 
elaboration of human rights by activating memories of atrocity and 
reviving the sense of common humanity that atrocity offends. 
At the heart of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion, in 
Lawrence v. Texas, is a conclusion that distills and relies on the Casey 
swing Justices’ “sweet-mystery”12 passage:  “[l]iberty presumes an au-
tonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct.”13  But there is nothing in the opinion 
that tells us why liberty presumes this kind of autonomy or why the 
people of the United States might have chosen to define liberty in 
this way.  The statement is made in absolute terms, admitting of no 
dispute.  It must be accepted, if it is accepted, as indisputably implied 
by our Constitution’s language or as indisputably “true.” 
The opinion of the South African Constitutional Court of course 
relied on the South African Constitution’s more explicit terms, not 
only in its requirement of respect for human dignity, but also in its 
guarantees against discrimination.14  But the power and clarity of the 
South African Constitutional Court’s opinion come equally from the 
fact that its constitutional tradition is explicitly responsive.  The Con-
stitutional Court has committed itself to constructing constitutional 
rights, liberties, and obligations in a way that reflects the lessons of 
apartheid and the principles embodied in the struggle against it.  
And it rightly and unreservedly takes confidence from the fact that in 
different cultures around the globe, democratic societies have chosen 
 
 10 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 11 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558; Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1998 (12) 
BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 12 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588. 
 13 Id. at 562. 
 14 See generally Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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to construct their founding documents similarly.  The South African 
Court spoke, not in terms of naked absolutes, but in terms unhesitat-
ingly informed by conscientious analysis of South Africa’s history and 
that of other nations.15  When it said that “[t]he experience of subor-
dination—of personal subordination, above all—lies behind the vi-
sion of equality,”16 it appealed to both logic and experience. 
In considering whether the sodomy laws’ discrimination against 
homosexual people was unfair, the South African court was required 
by precedent to focus on “the impact of the discrimination on the 
complainant or the members of the affected group.”17  It did this, not 
from a position of power, but from a responsivist’s position of empathy 
for those who are subordinated.  After observing that the experience 
of subordination lies behind the vision of equality, the court said:  
“[t]o understand ‘the other’ one must try, as far as is humanly possi-
ble, to place oneself in the position of ‘the other.’”18  Attempting to 
understand the constitutional question before it from all relevant 
perspectives, the South African court was able to weigh the full range 
of the government’s justifications for the discrimination against the 
full range of its personal and social effects.  A responsive constitu-
tionalism became, then, a more richly democratic constitutionalism. 
By contrast, the United States’ opinions concerning homosexual 
sodomy are acontextual, ahistoric, and lacking in empathy.  Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the United States Supreme Court opinion that Lawrence 
overruled, is written in terms that are painfully disrespectful of the 
sensibilities and likely perspectives of queer people.19  If the majority 
Justices had imagined their words being heard or read by anyone who 
was not heterosexual, it is hard to believe that these otherwise hu-
mane people would have spoken as they did.  The majority described 
Hardwick’s claim, that under the Court’s precedents, criminal pro-
scriptions against homosexual sodomy unconstitutionally infringed 
upon his liberty, as “at best, facetious.”20  Chief Justice Burger found it 
necessary in his concurrence to quote Blackstone to the effect that 
homosexual sodomy was an “‘infamous crime against nature’ . . . an of-
fense of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention 
of which is a disgrace to human nature,’ and ‘a crime not fit to be 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at ¶ 22 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY xiii (1983)). 
 17 Id. at ¶ 19; see also Harksen v. Lane and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at ¶ 50 (S. Afr.). 
 18 Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal., 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at ¶ 22 (S. Afr.). 
 19 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 20 Id. at 194 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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named.’”21  He then added this, without the cover of an attribution:  
“[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected 
as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral 
teaching.”22  Neither opinion contained a word that referenced the 
perspectives of homosexual people. 
When the United States Supreme Court overruled Hardwick, the 
majority opinion challenged the Hardwick majority’s narrow charac-
terization of the right at stake as a right to commit homosexual sod-
omy; it addressed the stigma that the anti-sodomy laws attach to ho-
mosexual people, and it disputed the Hardwick majority’s assertions 
that proscriptions against homosexual intimacy were sustained 
throughout Judeo-Christian cultures.  But, like the Hardwick court, 
the Lawrence court never spoke from or about the perspective of ho-
mosexual people.  Even in Lawrence, the queer were voiceless. 
What stands in the way of our adopting a responsive constitution-
alism?  I offer a story in answer:  The black physician, James McCune 
Smith, and the white patrician, William Gerrit Smith, were friends 
and colleagues in the abolitionist movement.23  In an essay written in 
1861, Gerrit Smith wrote that the president of the Southern Rebel 
Confederacy was “cheered and strengthened by the entire devo-
tion . . . to his cause of all around him.”24  McCune Smith pointed out 
in a letter to his friend Gerrit Smith that this single phrase showed a 
failure to appreciate the situation in the rebel South.  McCune Smith 
wrote:  “Is this true?  is it not virtually ignoring one half of those 
around Jeff Davis (I mean the Slaves)?”25  A substantial proportion of 
the people living in the Confederate states were slaves, free blacks, or 
Native Americans.  Yet, as McCune Smith understood, when most 
people in the United States during the Civil War imagined the Con-
federate community—when they imagined the political and social en-
tity that the South had become—they instinctively imagined it in 
terms of its superordinate members.  They erased slaves, Native 
Americans, and free blacks, and they imagined a white community. 
I tell this story to show how easy it is, even for people with the 
most egalitarian intentions, to slip into imagining a political institu-
tion or community in terms of its more affluent and powerful sectors. 
Assumption of a superordinate perspective is, of course, not only 
easy but also deeply consequential.  It is important, but not often dif-
 
 21 Id. at 197 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *215). 
 22 Id. 
 23 5 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 113–14 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1992). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 114. 
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ficult, to avoid fallacious reasoning in public discourse.  The difficult 
and often more consequential moves are made in the construction of 
premises rather than in reasoning from them.  And a great deal turns 
on whether those premises are chosen from a subordinate or a su-
perordinate perspective. 
Consider, for example, how one might analyze the equity of re-
quiring that a government guarantee its citizens a measure of social 
and economic security.  Is it fair that I be taxed so that this require-
ment can be enforced?  This is not a question of logic, but a question 
of valuation.  The answer depends on how I identify and monetize 
the value to me of what my tax dollars will buy.  To the extent that my 
tax dollars buy roads, power lines, street lights, sanitation services, 
and police protection that I use, then I have made an investment ra-
ther than a sacrifice.  If my tax dollars provide these basic services, or 
provide food, shelter, or medical care for others, I can regard the ex-
penditure as an unfair sacrifice.  But if I share a bond of community 
with those who benefit from my tax dollars, and if I value our collec-
tive well-being, then, once again, I can feel that I have made an in-
vestment rather than a sacrifice. 
A similar analysis could be made with respect to any number of 
public questions.  Affirmative action can be thought of as an inequity 
or as a social good.  Restraints on police interrogations or limitations 
on criminal punishments can be thought of as risky or respectful of 
human dignity. 
To focus on a tension between socioeconomic justice and sacrifice 
is to imagine the issue from a superordinate perspective, from a per-
spective of power.  This is a perfectly legitimate perspective, but it is a 
perspective.  If we think through the issue from different perspec-
tives, we might see it differently.  Instead of asking, “How is it fair to 
tax Joe the Plumber-Turned-Entrepreneur to benefit others?” we 
might take a subordinate perspective to ask, “How do we build a soci-
ety in which my children and I can be full participants?”  And we 
might take a collective perspective to ask, “How should the fruits of 
our nation’s natural resources and our people’s labor be shared?” 
A responsive constitutionalism forces us to recall atrocity and to 
revive the moments when our sense of common humanity caused us 
to stand against the abuse of power.  It sustains empathy and it sus-
tains community.  These things are not so easy to sustain.  There are 
reasons to doubt our capacity to summon the new South Africa’s de-
termination to face and learn from its past.  Alas, there is also reason 
to fear that South Africa’s Reconstruction will be abandoned as ours 
was.  But there are also reasons for hope.  After all, we have elected to 
the Oval Office a person who exudes the traditions of our Recon-
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struction’s heroes; who seems to speak with the wisdom of a James 
McCune Smith.26 
 
 26 See generally Neglected Voices, http://www1.law.nyu.edu/davisp/neglectedvoices/
index2.html (last visited May 8, 2009) (linking the speeches of sixteen African-American 
men who served in the United States Congress during the Reconstruction period). 
